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Abstract
Purpose:  This paper examines the principles of the Institutional Theory in order to
increase the understanding of the contractual covenants that Spanish venture capital
firms use in their relationship with the portfolio companies.
Design/methodology/approach: The study is based on the data obtained by means
of a postal survey addressed to the 70 Spanish venture capital firms registered in the
ASCRI (Asociación Española  de Entidades de Capital  Riesgo)  in  June,  2002, with  a
response  rate  of  68.33%.  As  a  theoretical  framework we base  on the  Institutional
Theory as a mechanism to understand the venture capital contractual process. 
Findings: The results  show that a large part of the Spanish venture capital contracts
are homogeneous. However, between public and private venture capital firms there is
some heterogeneity not only in relation to the industry but also within the field in the
design  of  contracts.  It  might  be  due  to  the  coercive  pressures  exerted  by  the
government on public entities.
Research  Limitations:  Although  survey  data  might  create  potential  biases  and
possible  measurement  problems,  we  consider  that  our  sample  has  large  enough
coverage  of  the  venture  capital  industry  (68.33%)  that,  although  cautiously,  valid
conclusions can be drawn. 
Originality/value: To the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first empirical
contributions analyzing financial contracts of venture capital firms in Spain. A better
understanding of covenants included in venture capital contracts can help Spanish firms
to understand the particular terms and restraints of venture capitalists before providing
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capital.  Moreover,  this  paper  also  has  clear  benefits  for  policy  makers and venture
capitalists. 
Keywords: Venture capital contract, Institutional Theory
JEL Codes: G24
Introduction
The work of Suchman (1995) proposes the Institutional Theory as a mechanism to understand
the venture capital contractual process, based on the idea that social and cultural pressures
become  established  as  a  rule  for  social  behaviour.  The  Institutional  Theory  states  that
organizations and their strategies are influenced by the institutional settings in which they
operate, and shaped by the institutional legacies which reflect the culture, history, and polity of
the particular country or region (Doh & Guay, 2006), making organizations homogenous over
time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call this tendency toward homogeneity "isomorphism", identifying
three isomorphic forces: coercive, mimetic and normative. As a consequence of these forces in
the industry, one might expect the behaviour of the venture capitalists (VCs) as a whole to be
quite homogeneous when choosing the covenants that  will  regulate  their  relations with the
companies they invest in (Jog,  Lawson & Riding, 1991 in Canada; and Isaksson,  Cornelius,
Landström & Junghagen, 2004 in Sweden). For example, less experienced venture capitalists will
copy the covenants included by their more experienced counterparts in the industry (Isaksson et
al.,  2004).  It  is also  possible  that  some organizational  fields  within  the  industry  are  more
homogeneous  than  others,  originating  differences  in  the  use  of  covenants  between  fields.
Empirical evidence provided by Isaksson et al. (2004) shows the existence of differences in the
use of covenants between public and private venture capital firms (VCF), or between early and
later  stage  investors.  Due  to  this  heterogeneity,  the  same business  proposal  might  obtain
different treatment depending on the venture capitalists that the entrepreneur approaches. This
creates uncertainty and could discourage entrepreneurs from applying for venture financing. 
Following the above theory and the existing evidence, the objective of this paper is twofold.
Firstly, we analyze whether Spanish venture capitalists in our sample are homogeneous as a
whole when writing their contracts with the investee company. Our results show that Spanish
venture capital firms in our sample are quite homogeneous. There are not covenants hardly
used by a high number of venture capitalists and 36% of the covenants are almost always
included in their contracts by more than 80% of the companies. However, some degree of
heterogeneity in the industry as a whole arises because 64% of covenants are only used by
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venture  capitalists  for  specific  situations  and  purposes.  The  second  objective  consists  of
checking whether there are some organizational fields that are more isomorphic than others.
We find the existence of differences in the design of contracts between public  and private
venture  capital  firms  that,  contrary  to  our  expectations,  arise  due  to  a  lower  degree  of
isomorphism within the group of public companies. It seems that coercive pressures exerted
by the government on public entities make their behavior heterogeneous not only in relation to
the industry but also within the field. 
We carry out our analyses using a survey dataset of 41 Spanish venture capital firms providing
information regarding contractual arrangements used in their relationship with their portfolio
companies.  We  think  that  our  sample  perfectly  suits  our  objective  due  to  the  important
expansion that the Spanish venture capital sector has experienced since the end the twentieth
century.  Venture  capital  finance  has  been  central  in  promoting  the  development  of  new
technologies,  job  creation,  economic  growth  and  the  regional  development,  which  help  to
develop and consolidate  a new category of  entrepreneurs,  who are  more innovate,  better
trained  and  more  dynamic.  It  should  be  also  highlighted  the  significant  financing  gap  of
Spanish small and medium-sized firms (SMEs), which makes the venture capital sector one of
the main players to many SMEs that  are rapidly  growing or that are developing high risk
products (Del Palacio, Zhang & Sole, 2012). In fact, the Spanish VC sector is basically focused
on SMEs, helping them to grow faster, create more jobs, and invest more forcibly than non-
financed firms in the sector.
Our paper yields two specific contributions. First, up to the best of our knowledge this is the
first paper analyzing the association between venture capital contracts and the Institutional
Theory in Spain. And second, our findings uncover the existence of unexpected heterogeneity
in the venture capital industry within the field of public own organizations. Further research on
this topic will show whether this heterogeneity is the result of greater flexibility or discretionary
behaviour from public venture capitalists. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research. Section 3 presents the
data and method. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
The Institutional Theory
According to Bruton, Fried and Manigart (2005), VCs are subject to different institutional forces
which can influence their behaviour. These institutional forces are studied by the Institutional
Theory, which considers the process by which organizations adapt to the social and cultural
pressures of the institutional environment in order to achieve legitimacy, become established
as a rule for social behaviour and make organizations homogenous over time. DiMaggio and
Powell  (1983)  call  this  tendency  toward  homogeneity  "isomorphism",  which  occurs  when
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organizations seek cultural and political legitimacy. The institutional isomorphism takes place
through three types  of  mechanisms defined by  DiMaggio  and Powell  (1983):  (1)  coercive
isomorphism is an exogenous force arising from political pressures and the need for legitimacy,
(2)  normative  isomorphism is  an  endogenous  force  that  stems  from the influence  of  the
professionalization and the role of education, and (3) mimetic isomorphism is an endogenous
force resulting from circumstances of uncertainty. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claim that the three institutional mechanisms create and diffuse a
common set of values, norms, and rules to produce similar practices and structures across
organizations  that  share  a  common organizational  field.  Organizational  field  is  defined  by
DiMaggio  and Powell  (1983) as “those organizations which,  in  the aggregate,  constitute a
recognized  area  of  institutional  life:  key  suppliers,  resources  and  product  consumers,
regulatory  agencies,  and  other  organizations  that  produce  similar  services  or  products”.
Throughout institutionalization these rules are embedded within an industry or the society as a
whole and become a guide for people and firms, reducing uncertainty and providing stable
structures  for  human  interaction  (North,  1990).  Institutions  are  defined  as  norms,  or
behavioral traits that guide human conduct explaining what is and is not, what can be acted
upon  and  what  cannot  (Hoffman,  1999).  North  (1990)  differentiates  between  formal  and
informal institutions. Formal institutions are laws and regulations usually supported by coercive
forces. Whereas informal institutions include taboos, norms, conventions, traditions and codes
of conduct supported by mimetic and normative pillars. 
The coercive dimension of the Institutional Theory is the most formal institution, and refers to
exogenous  pressures  exerted  on  one  organization  by  another  in  which  the  first  one  is
dependent  (DiMaggio  & Powell,  1983;  Scott,  1995).  This  regulatory  dimension  of  the
Institutional Theory is driven by the provisions of government legislation (North, 1990), as well
as industrial agreements and standards (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Han-Lin, 2010), that control the
behavior of firms (North, 1990). In VC context, government action or state intervention play
an important role in the development of institutional legitimacy by exerting pressure through
their control of funding, or by the exercise of their power to regulate (Frumkin & Gelaskiewicz,
2004; Cornelius, 2005). Public venture capitalists as perceived by policy makers have goals
similar to their own (Cornelius, 2005), such as the promotion of a region's economic growth or
small firm’s growth rather than obtaining a high profitability (Jeng & Wells, 2000; Cumming &
MacIntosh, 2006; Brander, Egan & Hellmann, 2009; Munari & Toschi, 2010). As a consequence,
coercive isomorphism should be stronger in the organizational field of public venture capital
firms, resulting in differences in the use of covenants between public and private VC firms.
The  normative  elements  of  institutions  are  the  expected  behavior  of  individuals  and
organizations  which  are  propagated  through  teaching  and  training  (DiMaggio,  2001).
Normative  isomorphism  is  usually  associated  with  the  pressures  arising  from  the  role  of
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professionalization, which leads to similar forms in a particular organizational field. DiMaggio
and Powell (1983) emphasize that professionalization is the collective effort of members of an
organization  in  order  to  define  the  conditions  and methods  of  their  work.  In VC context,
venture capitalists are trained in the same educational context and share similar cultural and
economic  background  as  well  as  norms  regarding  the  appropriate  way  of  working  in  the
profession. Therefore, the normative pressures derived from VCs' professionalization drives the
contractual behaviour towards standardization.
Cultural-cognitive institutions represent informal taken for granted rules and common shared
beliefs that are established among individuals through social interactions (Scott, 1995). These
culture/cognitive institutions were called mimetic isomorphism by DiMaggio and Powell (1983),
which arise in response to environments of great uncertainty and involve the imitation of the
behaviour, structures and practices of more successful or more legitimate organizations, in order
to increase their chances for survival. Since VCs-entrepreneur relationship is characterized by
risk and uncertainty (Tykvová, 2007), the most successful VC firms will be imitated by the less
successful ones, driving the VC contracting behavior toward standardization. 
Empirical  evidence  regarding the development  of  Institutional  Theory as an instrument  to
understand the financial contracts in the venture capital industry is scarce. Suchman (1995)
examines  108 financial  contracts  from two important  venture capital  funds  in  California´s
Silicon Valley, during the period 1975-1990. They find that venture capital contracts become
standardized over time due to normative isomorphism and that standardization declines with
geographical distance from Silicon Valley. Later, in Sweden, the Institutional Theory supports
the results provided by Isaksson et al. (2004). They find some differences between public and
non-public  venture  capital  firms  that  may  result  from  the  political  pressures  on  public
organizations. Private venture capitalists turn towards standardized covenants, whereas the
public ones leant towards situational elements. Their results do not show many differences
between the contractual choices made by more or less experienced venture capitalists. Finally,
they  find  that  early  and  late  stage  investors  are  two  different  organizational  cultures
controlling the design of contracts in these groups. 
Data and methodology
In this section we present the data and methodology we use in our analyses to study the
influence that the institutional forces might have on the standardization of venture capital
contracts. 
Data
The Spanish venture capital industry grew significantly until  2000, in terms of both capital
available for investment and the number of Spanish firms participating in the market. However,
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it  was at this point when the crisis arrived to the technological market, that the European
sector in general and the Spanish one in particular suffered its consequences. This meant the
end of the continued growth in investment activity, which fell from 1,320 million Euro in 2000
to 972 million  Euro in 2002 (Data provided by the Spanish association of venture capital,
ASCRI). 
We obtain the data by means of a postal survey addressed to the 70 Spanish VCF registered in
ASCRI  in  June,  2002.  The  design  of  the  questionnaires  received  valuable  contributions
provided by prestigious economists specialized in financial  risk assessment and particularly
related with the valuation of ventures. Before sending out the questionnaire, we contacted the
70 VCF to check their willingness to participate in the survey and identify the person in charge
of taking the funding decision. Three of the companies were reluctant to answer the surveys,
one was unreachable, and six had not made venture capital operations in recent years. From
the  60 postal  questionnaires  that  finally  were  sent,  41 questionnaires  were  received until
February 2003, which corresponds to a response rate of 68.33%. 
In table 1 we display some descriptive statistics of VC firms in our sample. We observe that the
average VCF is  9.54 years  old,  has almost  11 employees,  made investments and has 20
companies in its portfolio. Table 1 also shows the heterogeneity of our sample, where the age
of the firms ranges from 1 to 21 years old, firms have between 1 and 77 employees, the
number of investments ranges from 0 to 21, and venture capital firms have between 1 and 95
companies in their portfolio (this information was obtained from ASCRI yearbook 2003). 
 Mean Min. Max. S.D.
Age of VC firm (in years) (N = 41) 9.54 1 21 6.61
Number of employees in 2003 (N = 41) 10.54 1 77 12.39
Number of investments in 2003 (N = 35) 6.06 0 21 5.67
Number of companies in the portfolio (31.12.2003) (N = 33) 20.02 1 95 22.20
N is the number of available observations for each characteristic of the venture capital firm
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the respondents
Methodology
Since  some  organizations  field  might  be  more  standardized  than  others  as  a  result  of
institutional  pressures  within  the  field,  we  perform  a  discriminant  analysis  in  order  to
determine whether there are any differences between venture capitalists’ contractual choices
depending on the venture capitalist’s  experience,  investment  strategy or the origin  of  the
resources. The discriminant analysis is conducted because it is a technique that allows for the
identification  of  variables  that  best  discriminate  between  two or  more  groups  in  order  to
identify if certain groups of VCs act in a similar way.
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To carry out the discriminant analysis we use the variables that construct our hypothesis as the
dependent variables,  i.e.  firm structure (public  or  private capital),  development stage (the
preference for early or late-stage investments) and VCs' experience or inexperience. As for the
independent  variables,  we  use  the  25  covenants.  We  perform  the  analysis  by  stepwise
inclusion method in order to minimize Wilk’s Lambda in each step. 
Variables
Independent variables
Using a  five-point  Likert  scale  (1 = little  important;  5 = very  important)  the  questionnaire
collects  information  concerning  the  most  important  venture  capital  contractual  covenants
identified by previous empirical literature. 
Based on previous research, we have classified the covenants into four dimensions, which
allow us a better study and understanding of the venture capitalist’s behaviour in designing the
financial contract: 1) contractual covenants in the pre-investment relationship, 2) contractual
covenants  in  the  post  investment  relationship  management,  3)  contractual  covenants  in
specific  events  in  post  investment  period  and  4)  exit  covenants.  Out  of  25  covenants,  1
belongs to the pre-investment agreements category, 17 are classified in the post-investment
relationship management,  5  covenants included to  control  for  specifics  events  in  the post
investment period, and finally 2 are exit covenants.
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of our independent variables by groups and
ranked in descending order. The most significant contractual covenants are related to the post
investment relationship management, being the most important the periodic presentation of
accounting states with a mean of 5.00, followed by periodic economic-financial reports (4.95),
yearly  audits  (4.95)  and  the  presentation  of  the  next  budget  (4.90).  All  these  variables
represent the venture capitalist’s rights to be informed regarding the situation and evolution of
the company. The least important covenants are those that impose limitations on contracting
external advisors (2.65), that negotiate their contract’s length with managers (2.93) and that
control for the reliability of the information provided in the business plan (2.97).
Dependent variables
We classify firms in our sample into experienced or inexperienced using the median of the age
of the VC firm, which we calculate as the number of years since the foundation of the company
until 2003 (when we receipt the last questionnaire). We find a positive correlation between the
most experienced VC firms and the number of total investments made since the company was
founded  (Cornelius  & Hargreaves,  1991;  Isaksson  et  al.,  2004).  As  for  the  origin  of  the
resources and the investment strategy, we split our sample into public or private VCF and
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investors focused on early or late stage of development projects respectively using their own
assessment given in the survey. 
 Overall mean
n=37
Standard
Deviation
Pre Investment agreements   
Control for the reliability of the information provided in the business plan (due 
diligence)
2.97 1.13
Post Investment Relationship Management   
Periodic presentation of accounting states 5.00 0.00
Periodic economic-financial reports 4.95 0.21
Yearly audits 4.95 0.21
Presentation of the next budget 4.90 0.62
Information about substantial matters which may affect any aspect of the business 4.78 0.52
Right of VCs to participate in Bo D 4.68 0.82
Veto rights of VCs on important decisions 4.54 0.89
Veto Rights of the VCs in particular agreements 4.32 1.12
Veto rights on new issue of shares 4.24 1.20
Stand Still agreement 3.85 1.29
Veto rights on executive’s salary 3.59 1.48
Limitation on important expenses are established 3.51 1.41
Managers cannot spread the own technology 3.51 1.36
Non-competition clause 3.44 1.50
Limitation on the external indebtness of the company 3.39 1.37
Limitation on loan, transfer or advance in loan to administrators 3.34 1.40
Limitations on contracting external advisors 2.65 1.35
Specifics Events In Post Investment Period   
Anti-dilution ratchet 4.48 0.93
It provides a compensation for breach of contract 3.76 1.52
The VC Firm can to intervene if the objectives are not achieved 3.71 1.23
VC has the power to force changes in the Bo D 3.20 1.52
A dateline is fixed for the VCF to complain about errors or omissions 3.05 1.60
Exit   
Timing of exit 3.66 1.27
Length of contract 2.93 1.23
Measured on five point Likert scale: 1 (I completely disagree) to 5 (I completely agree). We limit our analyses to the 37 VCF that give 
their scores in all the variables.
Table 2. Contractual covenants in VC
Table 3 shows that the capital is private in 30 venture capital firms (73.17%), which are mostly
inexperienced and later stage investors (25 out of the 30 firms). Among the 11 public venture
capital firms, it is remarkable that there are 9 experienced organizations, probably because the
beginning of this industry in Spain was trigger by government intervention. Venture capitalists
in our sample show a clear preference (31 or 75.61% of the sample) by investments in late
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stages of development (post-creation or expansion financing), being 21 of them organizations
with little  experience.  Finally,  it  should be highlighted that  27 organizations (65.85%) are
classified as inexperienced. 
 VC structure   
 Public Private Row Total Significance
Development stage     
Early 5 (45.46%) 5 (16.67%) 10 (24.39%) *
Late 6 (54.54%) 25 (83.33%) 31 (75.61%) *
Column total 11 (26.83%) 30 (73.17%) 41 (100%)  
 VC structure   
 Public Private Row Total Significance
VC experience     
Experience 9 (81.82%) 5 (16.67%) 14 (34.15%) ***
Inexperience 2 (18.18%) 25 (83.33%) 27 (65.85%) ***
Column total 11 (26.83%) 30 (73.17%) 41 (100%)  
 VC experience   
 Experience Inexperience Row Total Significance
Development stage     
Early 4 (28.57%) 6 (22.22%) 10 (24.39%)  
Late 10 (71.43%) 21 (77.78%) 31 (75.61%)  
Column total 14 (34.15%) 27 (65.85%) 41 (100%)  
Statistical significance at the 10%, 1% level is indicated by *, ***, respectively
Table 3. Venture capital fund characteristics
Results
Description of covenants
For each VCF we reclassify our independent variables in a new scale consisting in three levels.
Variables  that  take  on  the  values  1  and  2  have  been  classified  as  seldom used,  those
covenants that score 3 are classified as sometimes used, and finally variables that take on the
values 4 and 5 are classified as almost always used. 
Next, each term is classified as rare, situational or standard. When a term is seldom used by
over 80% of the respondents, it is called rare. When a term is almost always used by over
80% of  the  respondents,  it  is  called  standard.  The  80% cut-off  is  selected  following  the
scheme proposed by Isaksson et al.  (2004).  Finally,  covenants that can´t be classified as
either standard or rare are classified as situational. In table 4 we observe that 9 covenants
(36% of the covenants used by VCs in our sample) are classified as standard, whereas 16
(64%) are situational covenants used to deal with specific contexts. No covenants are rare
(further detail of covenants included in each category can be found in Appendix C). These
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results suggest the existence of some heterogeneity in the design of contracts through the
inclusion of the so call “situational covenants”. 
Type of term Frequency %
Number of rare 0 0
Number of situational 16 64
Number of standard 9 36
Sum 25 100
Table 4. Summary of rare, situational and standard covenants
Differentiating strategies
Although the above analyses confirm that venture capital contracts are mostly standardized,
our results also show the existence of some degree of heterogeneity. Therefore, in this section
we want to assess the origin of those differences in the design of the contracts. 
We  use  a  discriminant  analysis  in  order  to  determine  whether  there  are  any  differences
between venture capitalists’  contractual choices depending on their  experience,  investment
strategy and fund structure. We carry out the discriminant analysis using the firm structure
(public  or  private  capital),  the investment strategy (the preference for  early  or  late stage
investments) and VCs' experience or  inexperience as dependent variables.  As independent
variables  we  use  the  25  covenants  included  in  the  survey.  The  analysis  is  performed by
stepwise inclusion method in order to minimize Wilk’s Lambda in each step, resulting in a
100% of correctly classified observations.
As we can see in table 5, most of covenants do not discriminate between venture capital firms
grouped  according  to  their  experience  (91.67%)  or  investment  preferences  (83.33%),
suggesting  that  normative  and  mimetic  pressures  drive  financial  contracts  towards
standardization.  However,  11  out  of  the  24  contractual  covenants  (45.83%)  discriminate
between public and private venture capital firms. Opposite to the results provided by Isaksson
et al. (2004), investment preferences do not seem to influence the design of contracts for
venture capital firms in our sample. Results regarding the experienced and venture capital
structure are in line with those presented by Isaksson et al. (2004). 
 Experience Investment
Preference
Firm structure
 No. % No. % No. %
Variables that do not discriminate 22 91.67 20 83.33 13 54.17
Variables that discriminate 2 8.33 4 16.67 11 45.83
The variable “Periodic presentation of accounting states” has been omitted from this analysis because 
it always takes on the value 5. 
Table 5. Discriminant analysis on the three dependent variables
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In table 6, we observe that those 2 contractual covenants discriminating between experienced
and inexperience firms are related with the situational loyalty clauses in the `post investment
relationship management´ (non-competition clause and not spread the own technology). In
addition, the non-competition clause is situational for the experienced VCs and standard for
the inexperienced ones.
 Experienced Inexperienced
 Rare Situat. Stand. Rare Situat. Stand.
Post Investment Relationship Management
Non-competition clause  x    x
Managers cannot spread 
the own technology  x   x  
Table 6. Analysis of rare, situational and standard covenants for experienced and
inexperienced VCs
Table 7 shows that among VCF preferring early stage investments, only 25% of the covenants
are standard, while for those that prefer to invest in late stages 50% correspond to standard
covenants. The main difference between the two groups is the veto rights that the venture
capitalists have in particular agreements, which is situational for early stages and standard for
later stages. Due to the high level of risk and uncertainty, the high risk of failure and the lack
of a strong legal system surrounding the early stage investments, VCs depend on previous
experience in selecting new ventures (Elango,  Fried, Hisrich & Polonchek, 1995; Ruhnka  &
Young, 1987, 1991; Klausner & Litvak, 2001; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2003; Bruton et al., 2005).
Therefore, when VCs make an investment in early stages of development, they tend to rely on
their  previous experience or they try to mimic the contractual arrangements of late stage
investments. 
 Early Late
 Rare Situat. Stand. Rare Situat. Stand.
Post Investment Relationship Management
Veto Rights of the VCs in 
particular agreements  x    x
Presentation of the next 
budget   x   x
A dateline is fixed for the 
firm to complain about 
errors or omissions
 x   x  
Exit
Length of contract  x   x  
Table 7. Analysis of rare, special and standard covenants for early and late VCs
Finally, public vs. private venture firms’ contractual choices are assessed (firm structure) in
table 8. Among public  VCF, 36.36% of the covenants are rare,  while for  the private ones
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36.36% correspond  to  standard  covenants.  A  rare  covenant  for  the  subsample  of  public
venture capital firms means that there are “seldom used” covenants used by more than 80%
of public firms. The main differences between the two groups are the right of VCs to participate
in the board of directors, the obligation of the firm to provide information about substantial
matters which may affect any aspect of the business, which are situational for public VCF and
standard for the private ones. The non-competition clause is rare for public firms and standard
for the private ones. Moreover, the power of the VCs to force changes in the board of directors,
the penalties for breach the contract, or the dateline for the VCF to complain about errors or
omissions are rare for public VCF and situational for the private ones.
 Public Private
 Rare Situat. Stand. Rare Situat. Stand.
Pre Investment agreements
Control for the reliability of the
information provided in the business
plan (due diligence)
 x   x  
Post Investment Relationship Management
Right of VCs to participate in Bo D  x    x
Limitation on loan, transfer or advance
in loan to administrators  x   x  
Non-competition clause x     x
Managers cannot spread the own
technology  x   x  
Information about substantial matters
which may affect any aspect of the
business
 x    x
Presentation of the next budget   x   x
VC has the power to force changes in
the Bo D x    x  
It provides a compensation for breach
of contract x    x  
A dateline is fixed for the VCF to
complain about errors or omissions x    x  
Exit
Length of contract  x   x  
Table 8. Analysis of rare, special and standard covenants for public and private VCs
According to  our hypothesis,  and the results  provided by Isaksson et al.  (2004),  coercive
isomorphic pressures seem to originate the heterogeneity we observe between the covenants
included  in  the  financial  contract  by  public  and  private  VCF.  The  consequence  of  these
differences  is  that  private  venture  capital  companies  are  stricter  in  the  application  of
covenants.
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Discussion and conclusion
On the basis of the Institutional Theory, the central inquiry of this paper is to provide new
evidence on the Spanish venture capital industry. The study is conducted by means of a survey
answered by 41 Spanish venture capital firms which supply information regarding contractual
arrangements used in their relationship with their portfolio companies.
In line with the findings of Isaksson et al. (2004) in Sweden, this analysis shows that a large
part of the Spanish venture capital contracts are quite similar. It shows a high level of industry
standardization. In this study, this is particularly obvious when we study the venture capital
firms according to some characteristics, such as VCs’ experience or investment preferences.
However,  some differences  in  the  design  of  contracts  between public  and  private  venture
capital  firms  appear  due  to  a  lower  degree  of  isomorphism  within  the  group  of  public
companies. This is the result of the coercive pressures exerted by the government on them,
making their behavior heterogeneous not only in relation to the industry but also within the
field.
The main difference with respect to the Swedish VC contractual arrangements (Isaksson et al.,
2004) is that the investment preferences have no effect on the design of contracts for the
Spanish venture capital firms. However, for the Swedish case, the two groups of firms (early or
later stage investors) operate in different institutional environment and, as a consequence, can
be seen as two different organizational fields within the industry. 
Our results contribute to shed light on the financial contracts used by venture capitalists, a
field  of  research  that  has  so  far  received  little  discussion  in  the  Spanish  literature.
Furthermore, this paper has clear benefits for policy makers, firms, and venture capitalists. A
better  understanding  of  covenants  included in  venture  capital  contracts  can help  firms  to
understand  the  particular  terms  and  restraints  of  VCs  before  providing  capital.  Venture
capitalists  can  use  the  information  from  this  study  to  better  understand  the  contractual
arrangements use in their  fields. And policy makers will  acknowledge the effect that their
pressures have on the design of venture capital contracts and, therefore, on the efficiency of
the industry when providing funds to firms.
There is however one note of caution with regard to our results. Qualitative information about
venture capital firms is difficult to obtain and often has to come from survey data, like in our
sample.  We  recognize  that  survey  data  might  create  potential  biases  and  possible
measurement problems (Zacharakis  & Meyer, 1998). However, we consider that our sample
has large enough coverage of the venture capital industry (68.33%) that, although cautiously,
valid conclusions can be drawn. 
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Further studies could expand the scope of this research to include new variables which may
affect  the  VC  contract,  such  as  the  location  of  the  firm  or  gender  of  the  VCs  from  an
institutional perspective.
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 Appendix A
List of VC firms for categorization (see methodology)
VC code Created No.
investments
2003
No.
employees
Firm
structure
Experience
group
Investment
preferences
VCF 1 1999 0 11 private inex late
VCF 2 1988 12 60 public exp early
VCF 3 1997 2 6 private inex late
VCF 4 2000 1 8 private inex late
VCF 5 1991 . 73 private exp late
VCF 6 1989 16 9 public exp early
VCF 7 2000 . 1 private inex late
VCF 8 1992 1 . public inex early
VCF 9 1986 4 12 private exp late
VCF 10 1984 3 6 public exp early
VCF 11 1988 . 3 private exp late
VCF 12 2000 . 1 private inex late
VCF 13 1987 . 4 private inex late
VCF 14 2000 3 . private inex late
VCF 15 2001 3 4 private inex early
VCF 16 1990 2 1 private inex late
VCF 17 1999 . 4 private inex early
VCF 18 1992 0 7 private inex late
VCF 19 2000 4 12 private inex late
VCF 20 1999 4 . private inex early
VCF 21 2000 2 3 private inex late
VCF 22 2000 1 8 private inex late
VCF 23 1982 11 8 private exp late
VCF 24 1999 0 19 private inex late
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VC code Created No.
investments
2003
No.
employees
Firm
structure
Experience
group
Investment
preferences
VCF 25 1999 3 2 private inex early
VCF 26 2000 2 . private inex late
VCF 27 1984 11 14 public exp late
VCF 28 1984 6 8 public exp late
VCF 29 2000 13 5 private inex early
VCF 30 1993 0 8 private inex late
VCF 31 1993 5 3 public inex late
VCF 32 1989 7 2 private inex late
VCF 33 1986 2 4 private inex late
VCF 34 2001 8 . private inex late
VCF 35 1998 5 5 private inex late
VCF 36 2002 11 7 private inex late
VCF 37 1987 6 16 private Exp late
The Number of investments is the total number of investments made since VC firm was established
Appendix B
List of covenants in contracts
Pre-investment agreements
Control for the reliability of the information provided in 
the business plan (due diligence)
There is an agreement on an economic margin which 
absorb omissions in the Business Plan
Post-investment relationship management
Limitations on contracting external advisors Entrepreneur should refrain from
transactions with intimates
Right of VCs to participate in Bo D VCs to requests one or several places in the investee’s 
Board of Directives
Veto rights of VCs on…
New issue of shares Limitations are put on purchase, subscription and sale of
any company’s shares
Executive’s salary Limitation on executive’s salary
Important decisions The Firm has the right of veto on some decisions
Financial Limitations
Limitation on important expenses are established  
Limitation on the external indebtness of the company  
Limitation on loan, transfer or advance in loan to 
administrators
 
Loyalty clause
Non-compete clause Non-competition clause is negotiated with managers
Managers cannot spread the own technology Managers are obliged not to spread the own technology
Informational requirements
Periodic presentation of accounting states Periodic presentation of accounting states: Balance and 
profit and loss account
Periodic economic-financial reports  
Yearly audits  
Presentation of the next budget The Firm has to present the budget for the next year, at 
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the end of the financial year
Information about substantial matters which may affect 
any aspect of the business
 
Veto Rights of the VCs in particular agreements A clause is fixed which requires a favourable vote in 
particular agreements from the Firm’s Advisors of the 
Venture Capital
Stand Still agreement The manager is not allowed to sell equity
Specifics events in post-investment period
VC has the power to force changes in the Bo D The venture capital firm leaves open the possibility to 
force changes in the investee’s board of directors
The VC Firm can to intervene if the objectives are not 
achieved
 
It provides a compensation for breach of contract  
Anti-dilution ratchet If the capital is increased, the venture capital firm has 
the right of preferential subscription in order to ensure it
ownership of the company’s security
A dateline is fixed for the firm to complain about errors 
or omissions
 
Exit
Timing of exit The Firm leaves open the possible temporal reduction of 
its permanence in the investee
Length of contract Contract’s length is negotiated with managers
Appendix C
Analysis of rare, situational and standard covenants
 Rare Situational Standard
Pre-investment agreements 
Control for the reliability of the information provided in the business plan 
(due diligence)
 x  
Post-investment relationship management
Limitations on contracting external advisors  x  
Right of VCs to participate in Bo D   x
Veto rights of VCs on…
New issue of shares   x
Executive’s salary  x  
Important decisions   x
Financial Limitations
Limitation on important expenses are established  x  
Limitation on the external indebtness of the company  x  
Limitation on loan, transfer or advance in loan to administrators  x  
Loyalty clause
Non-compete clause  x  
Managers cannot spread the own technology  x  
Informational requirements
Periodic presentation of accounting states   x
Periodic economic-financial reports   x
Yearly audits   x
Presentation of the next budget   x
Information about substantial matters which may affect any aspect of the 
business
  x
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Veto Rights of the VCs in particular agreements   x
Stand Still agreement  x  
Specifics events in post-investment period
VC has the power to force changes in the Bo D  x  
The VC Firm can to intervene if the objectives are not achieved  x  
It provides a compensation for breach of contract  x  
Anti-dilution ratchet  x  
A dateline is fixed for the firm to complain about errors or omissions  x  
Exit
Timing of exit  x  
Length of contract  x  
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